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THE TROUBLED DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CAPITAL GAIN AND ORDINARY INCOME
INTRODUCTION: THE CAPITAL GAIN-ORDINARY INCOME DISTINCTION
The Internal Revenue Code divides taxable gains and deductible losses
into two classes - ordinary and capital - and prescribes different tax treat-
ment for each.1 Broadly speaking, capital gains are taxed at preferential,
lower rates.2 Ordinary losses, if deductible, may be deducted from any taxable
income 3 but only in certain circumstances may the loss be carried forward.4
Capital losses are deductible from only a limited segment of incomer5 but
may be carried forward indefinitely. 6 The favorable consequences of capital
gain taxation and the mixed consequences of capital loss treatment motivate
taxpayers to seek "capital" or "ordinary" treatment as their interests in par-
ticular cases dictate.7 The Treasury's interest in maximizing revenue conflicts
with the taxpayers' desire to minimize taxes, and thus encourages the govern-
ment to oppose the taxpayers' efforts. The resulting controversy has placed
much pressure on the "capital"--"ordinary" dichotomy.
The Code effects the division between capital and ordinary gain or loss
by prescribing "capital" treatment for the gains and losses arising on the
"sale or exchange" of "capital assets," s which are described as a limited class
of property :9 it thus requires a particular kind of transaction in a particular
type of property to qualify for capital treatment. The "sale or exchange" re-
quirement'o can be interpreted in relation to sections 1001, which outlines
the method of computing gain or loss on the "sale or other disposition of
property," and 61(a) (3), which brings "gains derived from dealings in
property" into gross income." These provisions apply only to transactions
which "close out" the taxpayer's ownership interest in the property involved.12
Capital assets is defined as "property held by the taxpayer" which does not
fit within five exclusionary categories.' 3 By and large, the exclusionary cate-
1. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1, 61, 165, 1201, 1202, 1211.
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1201.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 63(a), 165.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1211.
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212, as amended, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 230 (Feb. 26, 1964).
7. Compare Grier v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), aff'd per
curiam 218 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955) with Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372 (1946).
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 122Z.
11. See Brrrmz, FEDERAL INcOmE, ESTATE AND Gn'T TAXATIoN 366-67 (2d ed. 1958).
12. Cf. Bittker, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property 51 (unpublished ma-
terials in Yale Law Library, 1963).
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
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gories produce ordinary tax treatment for the proceeds of ordinary business
dealings in property and leave capital treatment for proceeds from other
property dealings. 14 These exclusionary subsections 15 describe property whose
disposition generates income in the course of the taxpayer's common voca-
tional activities, such as property held for sale to customers 6 and accounts
receivable acquired for services rendered. 17 One of the exclusionary provisions,
section 1221 (2), excepts from capital asset treatment real and depreciable
personal property used in the taxpayer's business, even though such property
is devoted to rather than customarily dealt in by the taxpayer's business. Sec-
tion 1221(2) property, however, may still generate capital gain treatment
through the special provisions of section 1231.18
The particular method the statute uses to delimit the class of transactions
receiving capital treatment seems to jeopardize the very distinction it attempts
to create. By the terms of the statute, all property held is entitled to capital
asset treatment unless explicitly excluded. 19 Given the broad and flexible
concept "property" has become in the general body of law, 20 taxpayers will
often be able to fashion income-producing activity into dispositions of "prop-
erty." For example, the compensation for an entertainer's product endorse-
ments might take the form of a sale of his right to privacy rather than payment
for services ;21 and the gain potential existing in a favorable requirements
contract could be realized through sale of the contract rights rather than
through profits generated by performance of the contract.2 This ability to
shape transactions may well enable the taxpayer to avoid the application
of the exclusionary clauses.2 3 Had courts taken the position that the ex-
clusionary categories provided the only exceptions to a broad warrant for
the capital gain or loss treatment of property sales and exchanges, the class
of transactions receiving capital treatment might have absorbed a substantial
segment of all income-producing activities. To prevent such an erosion of
14. See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gain Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV.
985, 989-96 (1956), and text at notes 125-55 infra.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(l)-(5).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(4).
18. Victory Housing No. 2, Inc. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1953).
Compare Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Pittsburgh Athletic Co.
v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
21. See Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUm. L. REv.
713 (1948) ; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
See also Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Runyon v. United States,
281 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1960).
22. See Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958).
23. For example, the right to issue endorsements on all products might be sold to
a servicing company, thereby avoiding a pattern of sales which might bring section
1221(1) into play. Cf. Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952).
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the ordinary income base, courts have felt a need to go further than the ex-
clusions in narrowing the range of capital gain treatment.24
Judicial pursuit of the distinction between capital gain and ordinary income
has taken courts beyond the obvious cases where transactions not specifically
denied capital gain treatment so resemble dealings giving rise to ordinary
income that differentiation would be unseemly.2 5 It is the court's search for
standards in the penumbral area, where the proceeds from property transac-
tions may be refused capital gain treatment although not clearly denied such
treatment by the import of the statutory language, which is the subject of
this Comment. Though some courts have limited the class of privileged
transactions by finding no sale or disposition, 26 an absence of "property, '27
or an exclusionary category satisfied, 28 this Comment is limited to judicial
performance in situations acknowledged by the courts to involve a sale or
other disposition of non-excluded property.
Here for thirty years courts have sought in the statute, and in the economics
of transactions, satisfactory standards for guiding their decisions. Their
failure is evidenced by the atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion which per-
vades this shadow area.29 An examination of the operative policies and the
state of the law may lead some to reject the statutory distinction, perhaps
concluding that the arguments for a special tax category are unconvincing 3o
or that a comprehensive revision of the statutory scheme is essential. 31 But
the political climate indicates that such major changes are not imminent ;32
and, since courts must decide cases, the search for standards must continue.
THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE DISTINCTION
In interpreting the broad wording of the statute, it is only natural that
courts have looked for standards to policies commonly understood to support
the capital gain-ordinary income distinction. Three major policies - ameli-
orating the effect of telescoped income, encouraging investment, and increasing
24. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 51-54 (1955).
25. Compare Charles E. McCartney, 12 T.C. 320 (1949) with Commissioner v. P. G.
Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Duke,
Foreign Authors, Inventors, and the Income Tax, 72 YA.E L. J. 1093, 1100-16 (1963);
Fulda, Copyright Assignments and the Capital Gains Tax, 58 YALE L. J. 245 (1949).
27. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962).
28. See, e.g., Hollis v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
29. See generally, Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gain Taxation, 69 HARV.
L. RE v. 985 (1956).
30. See Clark, The Paradox of Capital Gains: Taxable Income That Ought Not to
be Currently Taxed, in 2 Housa COMM. ON WAYs & MEANS, TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM
1243 (Comm. Print 1959).
31. Note, Distinguishing Ordinary Income From Capital Gain Where Rights to
Future Income Are Sold, 69 HARv. L. REV. 737, 748 (1956).
32. See Presidential Message on Tax Reduction and Reform, 109 CONG. REC. 919,
926-27 (daily ed. January 24, 1963), and compare H.R. 8363, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 219
(1963).
1064]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the liquidity of investment funds - are often invoked in support of decisions.
On examination, each of these policies seems at best only partially reflected
in the statutory provisions. Consequently, no single policy provides a suc-
cessful test for distinguishing capital gain from ordinary income transactions.
33
Telescoping
Since increases in the value of investments often accrue during a period
of years, it is considered unfair to tax an accumulated gain in the year of
realization at a rate substantially higher than the rate which would have
prevailed had the gain been recognized as it accumulated.3 4 Originally, the
policy of ameliorating the effect of progressive taxation on telescoped income
was reflected in a provision which qualified for capital treatment only capital
assets held for two years or longer.35 A 1942 amendment 36 reduced the mini-
mum holding period to six months, thus increasing the number of situations
not involving telescoping in which capital gain treatment can be obtained.
Although this amendment rebuts an inference that the absence of telescoping
is an affirmative reason for denying capital gain treatment, it does not perforce
nullify totally the operative effect of the telescoping policy.37 The policy remains
applicable to all transactions involving gain accumulated over more than one
tax period. And while invocation of this policy conventionally involves refer-
ence to gains accumulated in the past, the rationale seems equally in point
when a taxpayer in the year of sale receives proceeds which represent the
profits he could expect to earn himself by holding and using the property sold.
38
The telescoping policy is most persuasive as applied to the investor who
in one sale realizes the gradually accumulated gain on a long time, major
investment.3 9 Assuming relative stability in his other income, progressive
taxation would enlarge his tax burden.40 But consider the diversified investor
who each year realizes the gain on a portion of a substantial investment port-
33. See text accompanying notes 51-59 infra.
34. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921) ; SELTZER, THE NATURE AND
TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITA. GAINS AND LOSSES 83-86 (1951).
35. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a) and (b), 53 Stat. 50 (1939).
36. Revenue Act of 1942, § 150(a) and (b), 56 Stat. 843 (1942). See INT. REv.
CODE Or 1954, § 1222.
37. But see Clark, op. cit. mpra note 30, at 1244-45; Miller, Capital Gains Taxation
of the Fruits of Personal Effort: Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1, 10
(1954) ; Note, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 737, 739-41 (1956).
38. See ALl, DRAFT OF A STUDY OF DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAPITAL GAINS
TAXATION 84-85 (1960).
39. Even for the long-term, single-asset investor, the effect of telescoping is not so
harsh as it may first appear. The owner of appreciated property receives the benefit of
the productive power of the untaxed accretions to value prior to realization. This benefit
- the use of an amount which would have been payable as tax had the accretion been
taxable when it accrued - may be valued at the compound interest such amount would
earn during the years between accrual and realization.
40. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1301-04, for other statutory devices designed to
counteract the effect of telescoping income.
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folio, and the investor who experiences within a short time a substantial in-
crease in the value of an investment, regardless of the length of time the
investment had been carried. These people are the beneficiaries of the capital
gain provisions, although it cannot be said that applying the ordinary graduated
tax to their income would be prejudicial because of any bunching effect.
Similarly, corporations, which are affected only slightly by the impact of a
graduated tax,4 1 do not require a downward adjustment of tax to accommodate
telescoping; nor does the person who, through such means as installment
sales,42 spreads the income from his transactions over many years.
The capital loss carry-over provisions 43 reflect a different aspect of the
telescoping problem. By limiting the deductibility of capital losses to off-
setting capital gain and $1000 of ordinary income in any year,44 the statute
reflects a general feeling that the advantages of capital gain treatment should
be balanced by restricting the capital loss deductions. However, while capital
loss and gain, if realized in the year accrued, might fairly reflect income if
offset in this manner, capital loss like capital gain may be bunched into one
tax period. Recognizing that the capital gain realized during one tax period
may be insufficient to offset a telescoped loss, the Code provides that capital
losses may be carried forward until fully deducted.45
Investment Encouragement
A second policy justification for providing preferential tax treatment is
the stimulating effect lower tax rates have on investment and, hence, on
economic growth.46 Investment, both financial and real, involves risking
economic resources currently exchangeable for consumption goods and serv-
ices, in the expectation of receiving a greater amount of economic resources
in future periods. As taxes reduce the claims on goods and services an in-
vestor may expect to control in future periods, they similarly reduce the
attractiveness of risk-taking opportunities. Lowering the tax rates on the
rewards of investment encourages investment, since the additional amount
of after-tax income will bring more risk situations within the investor's margin
of willingness to forego present consumption. The long-run effect of lower
tax rates on investment income would be a shift from consumption to savings,
with a resulting increase in investment and economic growth.
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
42. The effect of telescoping on installment sales varies depending upon the rela-
tionship of the payment arrangements to the manner in which appreciation in value
would accrue.
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212.
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1211(b). Corporations do not even enjoy the privilege
of using the $1000 ordinary income offset. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1211(a).
45. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212, as amended, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 230 (Feb. 26, 1964).
46. See Presidential Message on Tax Reduction and Reform, 109 CONG. REc. 919,
926 (daily ed. January 24, 1963) ; and see generally BurrzRs, THOmPSON & BOLLINGER,
EFFEcrs OF TAXATION: INVESTMENT BY INDIVIDUALS (1953).
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In effectuating the policy of encouraging investment, the statute operates
in a selective manner, bestowing the preferential treatment only on certain
forms of investment gain. An investment may offer a regular, recurring pay-
out, a residuary profit realizable only through the disposition of the investment
property, or a return mixing these two types of gain. The capital gain pro-
visions apply only to the residuary profits; therefore, equity investments, which
channel gains into accretions in property value, are the principal beneficiaries
of capital gain treatment. When gains are channeled into accretions in property
value, rather than paid out periodically, a reinvestment occurs which con-
tributes to the continued growth of capital. The effect of the statutory policy
is, thus, to favor reinvestment of enterprise profits and initial investment in
opportunities which offer the prospect of reinvestment. Windfalls, however,
manifest themselves in the same form as reinvested profits. Although wind-
falls do not fit within the policy of encouraging investment by shielding an-
ticipated gains from high tax rates, the statutory technique of favoring ac-
crued gains has the effect of rewarding them.
Investment Fund Mobility
The third policy frequently invoked in support of the capital gain provision
is the increased mobility accorded investment funds by lower tax rates, and the
beneficial effect such mobility has on the production of tax revenue.4 7 An inves-
tor considering a change in the allocation of his investment capital must weigh
the productive power of a profitable current investment against the produc-
tivity of an amount equal to the value of the current investment reduced by
the tax payable on the appreciation in value and then invested in another
enterprise. As the tax rate decreases and threatens to absorb a smaller pro-
portion of the accrued gain on an investment, the investor becomes more
willing to cash in his appreciated investment property to take advantage of
new investment opportunities. The rate of return required in order for the
new investment of the reduced amount to equal the yield of the old investment
becomes lower, and the investment opportunities offering such a return, more
plentiful.
When the lock-in effect of taxes substantially affects decisions about the
disposition of assets, the market allocation of resources will become inefficient.
The theory of market efficiency postulates that each individual will allocate
his investment resources to maximize their yield. Because individuals have
varying aspirations and abilities, different people may value the same invest-
ment opportunity differently, but each can be expected to invest in those
opportunities which appear most valuable to him. In obtaining property he
thinks has the greatest relative value, the individual maximizes the deploy-
ment of his investment capital. When the whole community acts in this man-
ner, resources are allocated with maximum market efficiency. If the amount




of taxes payable on a taxable disposition of property controls investors' de-
cisions not to shift from one investment asset to another, maximum efficiency
will not be obtained.
Investment immobility induced by tax considerations retards the collection
of government revenue. 48 The production of government revenue through the
taxation of accrued investment gains depends upon the owner's disposing of
his property in a taxable transaction. As any tax rate discourages sales and
other taxable transfers of property in proportion to its severity, a reduced
rate may well result in greater revenue production. The Code's provision that
heirs take appreciated property at a stepped-up basis, without assessing an
income tax on the capital accretion, 49 accentuates the discouragement of trans-
fers ordinarily induced by high tax rates; the postponement of realization until
the owner's death will exhaust, the potential for government revenue in the
appreciation of property. While the preferential tax rates reduce the "lock-in"
effect of taxes and thereby hasten the occurrence of taxable events that may
be postponed, the capital gain provisions also apply when a taxpayer must
dispose of his property - upon the retirement of a bond,50 for example. They
likewise apply to the installment payments under a sale agreement which
provides for periodic payments roughly equivalent to the income produced
periodically by the transferred property.
The Single Policy Approach
While these policies supplement the bare words of the statute in suggesting
the direction the capital gain provisions should take, they do not provide
ready tests for determining the applicability of capital treatment. The policies
would apply to a range of transactions both included and excluded from the
preferential capital treatment, and the statute, in turn, applies to situations
that fall both within and without the range of each policy's grasp.51 If the
statute is an inaccurate expression of each policy, it would seem unreasonable
to use any one of the policies alone as the tool for distinguishing ordinary
income from capital gain transactions. There is no apparent basis for a belief
that any particular policy represents the legislative purpose; the motivating
force behind the capital gain provisions seems to be an amalgam of the stated
policies.5 2 Dividend income, although part of investment return, is not granted
capital gain treatment, possibly out of deference to the telescoping policy;
48. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932).
49 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 102, 1014.
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(a) (1).
51. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 39-42 and note 46 supra.
52. Each of the three policies has been invoked in support of the capital gain pro-
visions by the House Ways and Means Committee. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1921) ; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2
Cum!. BuLL. 372, 396-97. Although there appears to be no explicit congressional recog-
nition of the policies' interaction, the failure of Congress to reflect fully one policy in
the Code, coupled with periodic references to each of the policies, leads one to the con-
clusion that the "statutory policy" is an amalgam.
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
and installment sales proceeds, though they may fail to invoke the telescoping
and fund liquidity policies, are treated as capital gain, perhaps out of respect
for the investment policy.
On occasion, however, courts have fashioned their opinions from the fabric
of a single policy. In Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc.,113 the Su-
preme Court was asked to decide the tax treatment to be accorded a sum re-
ceived by a common carrier from the government in compensation for a "tem-
porary taking" of its business facilities for ten months during the Second
World War.5" One of the reasons assigned by the Court for denying capital
gain treatment was the failure of the transferred property to qualify within
the Congressional purpose.
This Court has long held that the term "capital asset" is to be construed
narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford capital
gain treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of
appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and thus
to ameliorate the hardship of taxation of the entire gain in one year. 5
The Court's approach points up some of the difficulties raised by direct resort
to a single policy. Such a simplistic description of policy may avoid the diffi-
culties of relating competing policies and statutory provisions into a coherent
body, but it likewise prevents the standard against which transactions are
judged from reflecting a complete policy picture. The Court, for instance,
fails to reconcile the provision for a six months holding period with its "ap-
preciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time" requirement.
The six month holding provision indicates that the absence of telescoping has
no effect in reaching a decision against the grant of capital gain treatment.5 0
Concentration on any one of the policies, even when correctly interpreted, can
produce a gross distortion in the projected range of property embraced by
"capital asset."
Thus, the individual policies underlying the capital gain provisions, though
regularly invoked by judicial opinion-writers, are but dim lanterns in the
twilight segment of capital gain law. Whether or not expert economists could
divine and then apply the accommodation reached among the various policies,
it seems clear that courts, which have not even attempted the task, are not
competent to do so. 57 Unable to find standards capable of supporting reasoned
53. 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
54. Id. at 131.
55. Id. at 134.
56. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
57. See the concurring opinion in United States v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 12 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 2d 5895, 5899, (5th Cir. 1963), in which Judge Brown calls the substitute
for ordinary income doctrine "both bad economics and faulty law:"
Tax law, by the hand of man, the Acts of Congress, and the doubtful clarification
by Judges is complex enough without making it more so through the importation
of bad economics. For before we realize it, economics, which knows no law of
stare decisis, is infected by poor or bad law to set in train tax consequences
because of what Courts have said, not because of what the actualities really are.
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elaboration,5" courts have explained their decisions in terms of technical dis-
tinctions. These distinctions fall into three categories. The doctrines in two
of these categories center on the statutory requirements: does the transaction
constitute a "sale or exchange" or other taxable disposition; and does it
involve "property" embraced by the Code as a capital asset? The doctrine
in the third category explores the relationship between capital gain and in-
come which is taxed at ordinary rates: are the proceeds from a sale or ex-
change a substitute for ordinary income? In historical terms, the courts
tended to emphasize first "sale or exchange," then "substitute for ordinary
income," and, most recently, the definition of "property." 59
THE SALE OR EXCHANGE DOCTRINE
The capital gain-ordinary income distinction has engendered a body
of case law concerning the scope of the "sale or exchange" requirement that
section 1222 imposes for capital gain treatment. Section 1001 uses the phrase
sale or other disposition in specifying appropriate occasions for computing
gain or loss on property transactions, and this phrase is evidently read into
section 61(a) (3), which taxes "gains derived from dealings in property,"
and section 165, which allows deductions for losses "sustained during the
taxable year." 60 There is no reason beyond linguistic difference to suppose
that sale or exchange was employed in the Code to denote a narrower range
of transactions than sale or other disposition. Within section 1001, the phrase
sale or exchange is used in the subsection treating recognition of the com-
puted gain or loss without either indicating that sale or exchange has a nar-
rower scope than sale or other disposition or raising the implication that
recognition on dispositions other than sales or exchanges might be governed
by other rules.6 1 Furthermore, legislative history discredits the theory that
sale or exchange conveys a more restricted meaning. The House Ways and
Means Committee Report on the 1921 Revenue Act stated that the capital
gain provisions, which used the words sale or exchange, were to apply upon
"the sale or other disposition of capital assets .... -62
Nonetheless, courts soon found sale or exchange to encompass a smaller
group of transactions than sale or other disposition. True, in early cases, the
Board of Tax Appeals adopted the position that sale or exchange was as
broad as sale or other disposition."3 But it soon reversed its stand, over-
ruling an earlier holding that the retirement of a bond upon maturity con-
58. See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 160-79 (tentative ed. 1958).
59. See Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939); Hort v. Commissioner,
333 U.S. 28 (1941) ; and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
60. See BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 366-67 (2d ed. 1958).
But see Herbert's Estate v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 756 (3rd Cir. 1943) (dictum) and
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(c) (1957).
61. See BITTE R, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 392 (2d ed. 1958).
62. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).
63. See Henry P. Werner, 15 B.T.A. 482, 484 (1929).
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stituted a "sale or exchange" of the bond for purposes of the capital gain
provisions." Invoking the "plain meaning" rule 6r of statutory construction,
the Board said:
It is elemental that where a statute is clear and unambiguous in its terms
and provisions resort should not be had to legislative history to determine
the limits of its compass. The statute in question is so simple in con-
struction and so clear in meaning that it justifies no resort to the Con-
gressional Committee's reports as an aid in the interpretation thereof.
The words "sale or exchange" are ordinary words of well established
meaning. Taken in their context they are susceptible of no misconstruc-
tion. Payment of the amounts specified in the bonds, either at maturity
or pursuant to an authorized call prior to maturity, is not a "sale or
exchange" of such bonds. It is merely the payment of an obligation ac-
cording to its fixed terms. 66
This approach received the endorsement of the Supreme Court in a case
also involving the redemption of a bond before maturity: Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds, citing the Board decision with approval, announced, "Payment and
discharge of a bond is neither sale nor exchange within the commonly accepted
meaning of the words," or, perforce, within the meaning of the statute.67
The "sale or exchange" doctrine has shown much flexibility. The effect
of the doctrine on particular fact situations depends on two operations -
the definition of sale or exchange and the application of the selected
definition. Those courts which find a "sale or exchange" missing usually
subscribe to a definition of sale as a transaction in which one party acquires
a property interest in the thing sold and the other for a valuable consideration
parts with that interest ;68 an exchange is a transaction in which each party
64. John H. Watson, 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932).
65. See Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A
Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1549-50 (1963) ; HART & SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1145,
1267-69 (tentative ed. 1958).
66. John H. Watson, 27 B.T.A. 463, 465 (1932).
67. Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436, 437 (1939). The fact that bonds are
involved in the transactions considered in these cases may provide an explanation of
their result. The gain made on redemption of a bond purchased at a discount may be
considered deferred interest, and interest is normally taxed at ordinary rates. See INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (4) ; cf. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). Con-
gressional reaction to the judicial treatment of bond redemption is instructive: in 1934
redemption of a bond was stipulated to be an exchange, Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ 117(f), 48 Stat. 715 [now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(a) (2)] and the 1954 Code
rendered the gain received on the sale or exchange of bonds ordinary income to* the
extent the gain could be attributed to original discount, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1232
(a) (2) (A) (i), presumably because of its close relation to interest. Thus, there seems
to have been some recognition of the vacuity of the sale or exchange-sale or other
disposition distinction. Whether or not the peculiar nature of bond transactions suffices
to explain the courts' first use of a restrictive definition of sale or exchange, the result,
once reached, was applied more generally.
68. See, e.g., Charles E. McCartney, 12 T.C. 320, 324 (1949).
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parts with a property interest the other then acquires.69 The crucial question
under this definition is whether a property interest passed between the two
parties or simply was extinguished and vanished. For the interest to pass
there must be an identity between the property right the transferor had and
the one the transferee receives. 0 Some courts have demonstrated remarkable
ingenuity in tracing rights from one party to another in order to find a sale
or exchange, while other courts have displayed a comparable lack of ingenuity
in pursuing the same task with, of course, different results.7' There is, how-
ever, nothing inevitable about the preceding definitions, and other courts
have adopted a more simply applied and easily satisfied definition.
A group of cases involving the termination of exclusive agency or fran-
chise contracts illustrates the various ways in which courts work with the
concept of sale or exchange. Commissioner v. Starr Bros.7 2 deals with the ter-
mination of the exclusiveness of a druggist's exclusive right to sell a manu-
facturer's products in New London, Connecticut. Adopting a definition of
sale or exchange which requires the tracing of property rights, the Second
Circuit held that the transaction did not constitute a sale or exchange.
What the taxpayer gave in return for the cash payment was a release
of United's contract obligations, chief of which was its promise not to
sell its products to other dealers in New London. Such release not only
ended the promisor's previously existing duty but also destroyed the
promissee's rights. They were not transferred to the promisor; they
merely came to an end and vanished. 73
But in a prior case where the material facts were different only in that the
agency did not continue on a non-exclusive basis after the termination of
the contract (a distinction considered not relevant by the court which decided
Starr Bros.74), the Board of Tax Appeals held the transaction to be a sale.7r,
Employing the same definition as the Starr Bros. court, the Board found
that the taxpayer transferred, along with office records and good will, the
right to develop and exploit his exclusive territory and thereby to earn
royalties. 7 And the profit qualified for capital gain treatment. The Tenth
Circuit reached a result similar to that of the Board of Tax Appeals by em-
ploying a different definition of sale and avoiding the necessity of tracing
interests.77 According to the Tenth Circuit, "Broadly speaking, a sale is a
69. Treas. Regs. § 1.1002-1(d) (1957).
70. See Bingham v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1939).
71. Compare Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953) with Elliott
B. Smoak, 43 B.T.A. 907 (1941).
72. 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
73. Id. at 674.
74. The court rejected the holding in Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950),
which involved total termination of agency existing under exclusive agency agreement.
204 F.2d at 674.
75. Elliott B. Smoak, 43 B.T.A. 907 (1941).
76. Id. at910b. ...77. Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).
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transfer of property for a valuable consideration." 18 After determining that
the exclusive insurance agency contract or franchise "had at all times sub-
stantial value" and that "acting under its provisions, the agents developed
a large and lucrative business, 7 9 the court had no trouble finding that "by
terminating the contract and transferring the business to the company, there
was a sale and transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of the statute." 80
The paradox of these "sale or exchange" cases is that the existence of a
sale or exchange would evidently not have been questioned had the property
been transferred to a third party rather than to someone with a pre-existing
relationship to the transferred property.8 1 If a right to purchase under a
requirements contract or a note were transferred for consideration to a third
person, the transaction would undoubtedly qualify as a sale or exchange,
although transferring such claims or rights to someone with a pre-existing
interest in the underlying property would, under the Starr Bros. reasoning, be
some "other disposition.18 2 The pre-tax economic impact of a transfer of prop-
erty appears to be the same whether the transfer is classified as a sale, an ex-
change, or another disposition. The substantial difference in the tax treatment
of the transferor, depending on the relationship of the transferee to the property
involved, suggests that the use of "sale or exchange" as a subdivision of "sale
or other disposition" has no foundation in the economic realities of the trans-
action.8 3
THE SUBSTITUTE FOR ORDINARY INcOME DOCTRINE
A more candid effort by the courts to protect the ordinary income com-
ponent from erosion has been their examination of whether the proceeds
from the sale of property represent a "substitute for ordinary income." Such
scrutiny was first employed by the Supreme Court in Hort v. Commissioner,84
in which the Court was asked to determine the tax status of $140,000 paid
by a lessee to his lessor for the cancellation of a lease with a fourteen year
term remaining. The taxpayer contended that the lump-sum payment should
be taxed as capital gain. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Murphy, answered:
Where as in this case, the disputed amount was essentially a substitute
for rental payments which section 22(2) [now section 61(a)(5)] ex-
78. Id. at 453.
79. Id. at 452.
80. Id. at 453.
81. See, e.g., Walter H. Sutliff, 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942).
82. See Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1958) (requirements contract);
Bingham v. Commissioner, 105 F2d 971 (2d Cir. 1939) (note).
83. The Third Circuit has expressly disavowed any distinctions based on "the person
to whom a ... right is transferred." Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875, 876 (3rd Cir.
1954). See also Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1962), stating:
"[More] recent cases . . . have moved away from the distinction . . .between a sale
to a third person that keeps the 'estate' or 'encumbrance' alive, and a release that results
in its extinguishment."
84. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
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pressly characterizes as gross income, it must be regarded as ordinary
income .... [This section of the Internal Revenue Code] does not dis-
tinguish rental payments and a payment which is clearly a substitute
for rental payments.8 5
Does section 61(a) speak to the distinction between ordinary income
and capital gain as this statement assumes? Contrary to the intimations of
Mr. Justice Murphy in Hort, reference to statutory provision outlining the
content of gross income supplies no guides for refining the capital gain -
ordinary income distinction. The gross income provision applies to ".... gains
derived from dealings in property,"8 6 a category which would certainly in-
clude any "sale or exchange" of property. Since capital gains and losses
emanate only from the sale or exchange of property,8 7 section 61(a) would,
under one plausible reading of the Court's statutory interpretation in Hort,
totally pre-empt the domain of capital gain.
More fundamentally, any attempt to distinguish between proceeds which
substitute for ordinary income and other gains is foredoomed. The market
price of investment property is composed of the discounted value of the future
income anticipated to flow from the investment while its owner holds it plus
the discounted value of the proceeds expected upon the resale of the property
at the end of that period.88 Upon successive sales the market price continues
to be composed of the income and resale constituents, so at any point in time
the market price represents anticipated ordinary profits. This proposition is
true even for that part of the price which represents the salvage value of the
property, for that component represents the profits anticipated by those who
will salvage the property. All gain on property transactions could thus be
characterized as a substitute for ordinary income.19 Presumably, the Court,
when it distinguished substituted ordinary income from capital gain, was
not referring to so broad an interpretation of substituted income as the pre-
ceding statutory and economic analyses provide. But its point of reference
remains obscure.
Courts have reacted to the Hort principle in various ways. At least one
court has interpreted it as establishing mutually exclusive classes of property
rights, one of which gives rise to anticipated ordinary income and, the other,
to capital gain. In Bell's Estate v. Commissioner,9" the Eighth Circuit held
that the proceeds from the sale of a life estate in a trust by the life tenant to
the remainderman were taxable as capital gain, relying on the Supreme Court's
85. Id. at 31-32.
86. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (3).
87. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222.
88. See SAmuELsON, EcoNomics 647-50 (5th ed. 1961); 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION
OF PROPERTY 216-66 (1st ed. 1937).
89. Compare the effect of § 1245, IT. REv. CODE OF 1954. In this regard, see gen-
erally Schapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section 1245 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1483 (1963).
90. 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
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opinion- in Blair v. United States.Y1 The Blair case held that the transferee
of a life estate was liable for income tax on the annual yield. In the process
of distinguishing the Blair facts from earlier cases in which the Court had
held that the assignment of income did not transfer tax liability, Chief Justice
'Hughes found that the owner of a life estate has' a beneficial interest in the
property . 2 He declared, "The assignment of the beneficial interest is not
the assignment of a chose in action but of the 'right, title, and estate in and
t6 property.' "93The Eighth Circuit equated the Supreme Court's distinction between a
'transfer of beneficial ownership and an assignment of income to a distinction
between proceeds from the sale of a capital asset and proceeds representing
a substitute for ordinary income.94 But this equation was mistaken. There
is no apparent reason why the consideration received for a property interest
which, had it been assigned, would have transferred income tax liability,
could not be a "substitute for ordinary income" so far as the transferor is
concerned. The Eighth Circuit should have recognized that Hort, in concept
if not in expression, held that formal satisfaction of the statutory require-
ments for capital gain did not preclude classifying the transaction's proceeds
as a substitute for ordinary income - that is, the finding that a payment
represents a substitute for ordinary income does not logically exclude a find-
ing that the transaction involves a sale or exchange of a capital asset.9
Other courts which have used the substitute for ordinary income doctrine
to accommodate the competing claims for ordinary income and capital gain
taxation have resorted to notions of policy to govern its use. In a case again
involving the sale of a life estate, the Second Circuit said the distinction
between sale proceeds that were a substitute for ordinary income and those
that were capital gain turns on the difference between "anticipation of income
payments over a reasonably short period of time and an out-and-out transfer
of a substantial and durable property interest, such as a life estate at least is."''9
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, IncY7 appeared to be
motivated by two related factors - the near identity between the sale price
and the discounted value of the pay out expected from the transferred right
(reflecting the lack of economic risk to the transferee) 98 and the short life
91. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
92. Id. at 12-13.
93. Id. at 13-14.
94. Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir. 21943).
95. The Court assumes that the lessor's rights in the Hort transaction are "property"
and says nothing to indicate that the transaction does not qualify as a sale or exchange. The
Court seems to be identifying a distinction based on the function of the proceeds rather
than the elements of the transaction when it says that proceeds are a substitute for
ordinary income. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
96. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1946).
97. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
98. Id. at 265-66.
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of the transfer'ed interest R - when it ruled that the gain on the sale of an
oil payment right was taxable as Ordinary income.100 The factors noted in
Lake, however, do not serve to rationalize the cases. The Ninth Circuit, sub-
sequent to Lake, held that a prime-lessee's sale of his remaining leasehold
rights of two years' duration to his sub-lessee for a price based on the antici-
pated rent did not yield a substitute for rental payments because "the trans-
hction constituted a bona fide transfer for a legitimate purpose. . . ."-0o Ac-
'cording to that court, "The case is not one of a liquidation of a right to future
income as is Hort, but rather it is one of a disposition of income-producing
property itself."' 02 On the other hand, the Tax Court held prior to Lake that
the sale by a taxpayer of his right to receive a fixed percentage of the sales
price received by a seller in dealings with a corporation in which the seller
and taxpayer were co-owners was an anticipation of ordinary income, although
the amount of the periodic payments was unpredictable, the economic life
ipan of the venture was open-ended, and considerable enterprise risk was
involved. 10 3 Whether or not courts could develop a consistent approach to
the substitute-for-ordinary-income doctrine through the use of relevant policy
considerations, the structure of the doctrine has not encouraged them to do
so, and inconsistencies continue to arise.
THE PROPERTY DOCTRINE
The doctrinal device most recently developed by courts focuses on the
definition of capital asset as "property."' 1 4 The cases separate into two groups
,-those concerned with the capacity of certain contractual rights to survive
a disposition in order to qualify the transaction for capital gain treatment
under the strict "sale or exchange" interpretation, and those which deal
with the statutory, meaning of property.
-Naked and Substantial Rights
The *theoi'y that certain pr6perty inferests survive a disposition which might
otherwise be considered to have extinguished or cancelled them is employed
primarily to int6duice exceptions into the framework established by those
courts which tend to fiid the requirements for sale or exchange unsitisfied
when contractual rights and duties are terminated. 0 5 And this theory suffers
from the same flaws of artificiality as its complement, the "sale or exchange"
doctrine. 10 6 The cases from which this theory descends have little in, common
Nvith their offspring. The line of cases starts at Blair v. United State'.'°7. The
99. Id. at 262-63.
100. Id. at 264.
101. Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 1960).
102. Ibid.
103. Charles E. McCartney, 12 T.C. 320 (1949).
104. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
105. See text accompanying notes 68-80 ,4pra.
106. See text accompanying notes 60-83 sittra.
107. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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holding in Blair is that the assignment of a life estate effectively transfers to
the assignee the income tax liability on the annual yield. The Supreme Court's
decision included a finding that the assignment of a life estate effectively
transfers a "right, title, and estate in and to property" to the assignee.108
Although Blair dealt with the income-splitting problem, Bell's Estate v. Com-
missioner turned that finding into a holding that the assignment of a life es-
tate was the transfer of income producing property rather than merely a
transfer of a right to income, and hence gave rise to capital gain. 10 9 The
Second Circuit, presented with a case involving the sale of a life estate,
agreed with the Bell's Estate decision, saying that a life estate was a "sub-
stantial and durable property interest.""10 As with Bell's Estate, the principal
question considered in the Second Circuit's case was whether the sale an-
ticipated future ordinary income."'
The Second Circuit has gradually developed a greater willingness to find
the transfer of property requisite for a sale or exchange." 2 A landmark de-
cision in this development appears in Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drum-
mond,118 where the court categorized as the sale of a capital asset a trans-
action involving a lessor's payment to his lessee on the cancellation of their
lease. The court made this inroad on its previously narrow reading of sale or
exchange by improvising on the concept of a present property interest intro-
duced in Bell's Estate 114 to develop a property test, thus distinguishing prior
decisions in which it had held that an agent's surrender of his agency contract
to the principal did not constitute a sale or exchange:
... [In the agency cases, there was no sale or exchange within the mean-
ing of the statute] because the contractual right was not transferred,
but was released and merely vanished. However, we think the right of
possession under a lease or otherwise, is a more substantial property
right which does not lose its existence when it is transferred." 5
Given the court's acceptance of the sale or exchange-sale or other dispo-
sition distinction, it is surprising to find the court characterizing the trans-
action as a transfer rather than an extinction of the lessee's rights; the court
offers no explanation for so doing. Yet in this way, the convenient concept
of the "more substantial" property right was uncovered. In a later case,
the Second Circuit found it expedient to distinguish away McCue Bros. in
order to resuscitate the rationale of its earlier agency contract cases; it then
108. Id. at 13-14.
109. 137 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir. 1943). See also discussion in text at notes 90-94 supra.
110. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1946).
111. Id. at 236.
112. For their rejection of the "sale or exchange" doctrine, see Commissioner v.
Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
113. 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1954).
114. 137 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1943).
115. 210 F.2d 752, 753 (2d Cir. 1954).
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discovered the complement of the "more substantial" contract right, the
"naked" or "mere contract right."""8
Neither the definition of "naked" and "substantial" contract rights nor
the difference between them is clear. In both cases, the courts had alternate
grounds sufficient to support the decision, 117 and seem to have used the terms
"substantial" and "naked contract rights" only to denote respectively those
contract rights which did and did not give rise to capital gain treatment. 1 8 It
is possible, however, that courts in the future, instead of using the terms
only as labels describing the tax consequences reached on other grounds,
will reason from the label to the tax treatment. The implications of this
possibility are disturbing. In the area of contract rights, for example, the
extinguishment principle derived from the sale or exchange doctrine" 9 has
limited the availability of capital gain treatment in transactions between par-
ties to a pre-existing contract. If the contract rights so transferred were
labeled "naked," then unfavorable tax treatment would also attach where
third parties were the transferees of the contract rights. Since the "naked"
and "substantial" test provides no foothold in the policies underlying the
capital gain statute and, at best, serves only to provide labels for conclusions
reached by courts, use of this test will serve to expand the randomness of
the sale or exchange doctrine to cover the whole domain of property trans-
actions. In effect, it would abandon what has been an arbitrary method for
distinguishing transactions based on the parties involved in favor of an
equally arbitrary method of distinguishing transactions based on the "type"
of contract rights involved. Classification of the contract rights would be
effected by indiscriminate reference to the results of prior judicial sallies
into the penumbral area.
Something like this development seems to be reflected in a recent Second
Circuit decision. In Commissioner v. Ferrer,12 0 involving a complex transfer
of production rights to Moulin Rouge, the court rejected rationalizations
previously employed,' 12 in favor of a distinction turning upon whether the
rights transferred were enforceable by the transferor at equity.12 2 The court
purported to justify the proposed distinction by analyzing situations appearing
in prior decisions where capital treatment had been at issue in order to find
a distinguishing feature. 123 Although the former doctrines were abandoned,
116. Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1958).
117. Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958) (substitute for
ordinary income); Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.
1954) (sale or exchange).
118. Ibid. See also Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1958).
119. See text accompanying notes 68-73 mipra.
120. 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
121. Id. at 129-31.
122. Id. at 133-34.
123. Id. at 130-31.
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the court's reasoning merely enshrines the arbitrary decisions reached under
past doctrines in a new theology.
None of the doctrines examined thus far has provided the courts with a
viable basis for determining which transactions give rise to ordinary income
and which yield capital gain. As a result confusion marks the body of case
law distinguishing between capital gain and ordinary income. Even if courts
utilizing the foregoing three doctrines are motivated by relevant policy
considerations, the decisions appear couched in ultimate terms that do not
lend themselves to reasoned elaboration. This means not that courts using
these doctrines cannot reach results generally consistent with the policies
underlying the statutory provisions, but that they are unlikely to reach such
results. The obligation of a court to reach decisions through reasoning, upon
which the coherence of case law depends, is not enforced. Consequently, the
ability of courts to learn from one another is diminished, and classification
of transactions in this area becomes a function more of accident and less of
design. The tax consequences of transactions are sufficiently important to the
commercial community '24 to warrant insistence that courts continue to search
for a method of reaching their results through the process of reasoned elabora-
tion. Only through the evolution of a comprehensible pattern of judicial de-
cisions will businessmen be able to predict the tax consequences that will
attach to their commercial transactions.
The Business - Investment Distinction
There is a final line of cases, the second group arising under the "property"
requirement, which may provide a sounder doctrinal basis for judicial inquiry
than "sale or exchange," "naked and substantial contract right," or "substi-
tute for ordinary income." Beginning with Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Commissioner,1 25 these cases, initially through the use of a rough distinction
between business property and investment property, attempt to narrow the
capital asset concept: by narrowing the range of capital asset they reduce
the number of transactions giving rise to capital gain.
Before Corn Products, the "capital asset" concept was not seen as a fruitful
source of limitations on capital gain treatment. Lower courts normally either
assumed that the asset involved in the transaction before them was a capital
asset or read what is now section 1221 with the following syllogistic reasoning,
to reach the same result:
a) "capital asset" means property as defined by the general body of prop-
erty law, except for that property within the five specified excluded
classes.
b) the right under consideration is considered property within the body
of general law and does not fit within any of the statutory exclusions.
c) therefore, the property right is a capital asset.' 20
124. See Comiissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F2d 344, 352 (2d Cir. 1958) (dissenting
opinion).
125. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
126. Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).
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In Hort v. Commissioner,.27 the Supreme Court began to undermine the
syllogism by attacking the first part of the major premise. In holding that
a payment from a lessee to a lessor in return for the cancellation of a lease
was ordinary income because the payment was a substitute for rental income,
the Court said, "[I]t is immaterial that for some purposes the contract cre-
ating the right to such payments may be treated as 'property' or 'capital.' ,,18
It was this hint that the Court in Corn Products picked up and developed into
an explicit rejection of the proposition that property is used in its ordinary
sense within the definition of capital asset in section 1221.
The Corn Products Company, because it had limited storage facilities,
bought corn futures during the harvest season to avoid the effects of a price
rise if one should occur during the year. It would then either take delivery
during the year, or sell the futures and with the proceeds buy corn in the spot
market as it was needed.' 29 The company claimed that the gains arising on
the sales of futures were capital gains. The Supreme Court disagreed:
[The petitioner's transactions] do not come within the literal language
of the exclusions. . . . They were not stock in trade, actual inventory,
property held for sale to customers or depreciable property used in a
trade or business. But the capital asset provisions of section 117 [now
section 1221] must not be so broadly applied as to defeat rather than
further the purpose of Congress .... Congress intended that profits and
losses arising from the everyday operation of a business be considered
as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss. The preferen-
tial treatment... applies to transactions in property which are not the
normal source of business income.130
Notice how the Court proceeded in Corn Products. It admitted that it could
not fit the taxpayer's transaction within the stock in trade, actual inventory,
or other section 1221 exclusions; but it used those categories as indicia, pointing
toward the type of property Congress intended to exclude. It capsulized this
intent by distinguishing between those transactions which arise from the
"everyday operation of a business"''1 and those which arise from the activities
of a "legitimate capitalist."''1 Applying this distinction to the facts in the
case, the Court said:
[T]he claim of Corn Products that it was dealing in the market as a
"legitimate capitalist" lacks support in the record. . . [I]n labeling its
activity as that of a "legitimate capitalist" exercising "good judgment" in
the futures market, petitioner ignores the testimony of its own officers
that in entering that market the company was "trying to protect a part
of [its] manufacturing costs"; that its entry was not for the purpose
of "speculating and buying and selling corn futures" but to fill an actual
"need for the quantity of corn [bought] . . . in order to cover . . . what
127. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
128. Id. at 31.
129. 350 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1955).
130. Id. at 51-52.
131. Id. at 52.
132. Id. at 50.
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[products] we expected to market over a period of fifteen or eighteen
months." It matters not whether the label be that of "legitimate capitalist"
or "speculator"; this is not the talk of the capital investor but of the far-
sighted manufacturer. For tax purposes petitioner's purchases have been
found to "constitute an integral part of its manufacturing business."...133
Rights and assets involved in the daily ebb and flow of business activity would,
if sold, give forth ordinary income. Thus, if a company contracted to pur-
chase raw materials one year hence but sold the right to receive the material
shortly before the shipment was due, the proceeds of the transaction would
seem to be taxable at ordinary rates. With an "everyday operation" test as
a crucial determinant of the taxation of transactions, the use made of the
property by the taxpayer rather than its external characteristics becomes the
critical factor. Distinguishing according to the role an asset plays in com-
mercial enterprises leads to the business property-investment property
distinction which emerges from the Corn Products opinion.13 4
The distinction between business property and investment property might,
like the other doctrinal distinctions, appear to be simply a restatement of the
capital gain-ordinary income dichotomy, offering as little direction and as
little hope for reasoned elaboration. As a starting point for judicial decisions,
however, the business-investment distinction may have an advantage. The
doctrinal tests of "sale or exchange," "substitute for ordinary income" and
"naked or substantial" contract rights were established and continue to exist
primarily within the confines of the taxation statute and case law. Constructed
for use in the area of capital gain taxation, these concepts, to the extent they
are sensible, have no intrinsic content but rather provide frameworks for the
expression of decisions reached by other means. In his search for meaning,
the decision-maker is inexorably drawn back into the vortex of policies under-
lying the statute; but, without a suitable reference point, the complex and con-
fusing policy considerations do not provide a satisfactory basis for judicial
reasoning. Analysis of the policies and transactions on a case-to-case basis
demands more expertise and sophistication in economics than courts should
be asked to provide. Unlike the concepts employed in the other doctrinal
distinctions, "business" and "investment" have some reference to real world
experience. Although "business" and "investment" would require further
elaboration before providing a workable standard, they offer at least the
possibility that an examination of differences between them will suggest some
external distinction which will appear relevant to the differing tax treatment.
The Capital Structure Test
The Supreme Court has had one opportunity to elaborate the business
property-investment property distinction, in Commissioner v. Gillette
133. Id. at 50-51.
134. See generally, Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69
HARV. L. REv. 985 (1956).
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Motor Transport, Inc., 35 but passed it by. The experience of Corn Products
in the Fifth Circuit offers more promise. A recent decision there seems to
provide an important advance in the elaboration of the distinction. Nelson
Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner 136 concerned the sale of the taxpayer's
rights as mortgage servicing agent under an agreement with a major insurance
company. Distinguishing the Corn Products facts, the court said:
By no stretch of the imagination can the routine day-to-day sale of corn
futures be equated with an isolated sale of an agency contract. Here the
taxpayer sold and transferred a franchise or contract which for eight
years had constituted one of the chief items of its capital structure ...
This was one isolated transaction in which the taxpayer disposed of
property which was the means by which it had conducted more than
half of its business operations over a period of years.13 7
The concept of a "chief item in an enterprise capital structure" is, in a
sense, only one step removed from "investment," but the step is in the di-
rection of clarification. The "profits and losses arising from the everyday
operation of a business" of Corn Products is contraposed to the gain on the
sale of a major item in an enterprise capital structure. The distinction which
emerges in Nelson Weaver is between property which is introduced into the
enterprise's business activities, is processed, and either exits as part of the
final product or is consumed in its production and property which enables
the enterprise to process its raw materials. 3 8
This distinction, of course, has its difficult points. Just as every transaction
involves a substitute for ordinary income, so most assets, including many
given capital treatment as a matter of course,'3 9 are devoted to the production
process and eventually consumed in it. Because there exists a referent to ex-
perience in the real world, however, a meaningful line may emerge. One means
of approaching the problem would be to analyze those assets traditionally
considered part of the capital structure and to contrast them with assets not
considered part of that structure. The buildings within which an enterprise
operates, as well as the land they occupy and the machinery employed inside
them, are normally assumed to fall in the capital structure category. One
characteristic such assets have in common is the length of time they contribute
to the enterprise operation. Such assets produce a stream of income. On the
other hand, raw materials and inventory property, both of which are con-
135. 364 U.S. 130 (1960). The case is discussed in the text at notes 53-54 supra.
136. 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962).
137. Id. at 902.
138. The viability of the Weaver decision is already in question. Within three months
of its publication, Weaver was limited by a different Fifth Circuit panel to situations
involving "a sale of a property right equivalent to a sale of a business and good will.. ."
United States v. Eidson, 310 F2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1962). More recently, however, a
third panel of the Fifth Circuit has rejected Eidson and attempted to resuscitate Weaver.
United States v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5892 (5th Cir. 1963).
139. See, e.g., Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949).
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sidered outside the capital structure, make only a one-shot contribution to
enterprise income.
This duration phenomenon is not only characteristic of assets traditionally
considered part of the capital structure but also is characteristic of assets
which, in well-settled areas, give rise to capital gain tax treatment. Good will
provides an excellent example. 140 Good will represents the difference between
the enterprise's value as a going concern and its physical value. 141 Good will
is embodied in such advantages as business locations, a trained staff, special
processes, and an established clientele, all of which present additional money-
making opportunities to the enterprise possessing them.'4 These opportunities
usually present themselves over a long period. If good will is sold, the oppor-
tunity for future income is cashed in, and capital gain treatment is accorded.143
The treatment of section 1231 assets offers another illustration.14 That
section provides that real property and depreciable property used in trade
or business, machinery for example, are to receive capital gain treatment un-
der prescribed, but not unusual, circumstances. 14 5 This property also has the
potential for making a continuing contribution to enterprise income. In
contrast, those assets specifically excluded from the capital asset treatment
are, by and large, only fleetingly involved in the productive operation of an
enterprise.146
The existence or non-existence of the potential for making a continuing
contribution to the enterprise seems a potentially valuable test for identifying
items in the capital structure, since it evidently coincides with a characteristic
distinguishing property which gives rise to capital gain from property which
does not. For non-business situations, the same potential for continuing con-
tributions to income - imputed or actual - bears equal promise. The ques-
tion remains, however, whether such a test, based on the potential duration
of an asset's contribution to the enterprise, identifies a fortuitous distinction
between capital gain and ordinary income transactions or, in fact, reflects
to a significant extent the policies said to underlie the capital gain provisions. 147
When disposition of the property would collapse the anticipated stream of
140. Id. at 19.
141. George J. Staab, 20 T.C. 834, 840 (1953).
142. See Bittker, Capital Gains and Losses 72-73 (unpublished materials in Yale
Law Library, 1963).
143. See, e.g., Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17, 19 (1949).
144. See, e.g., Victory Housing No. 2, Inc. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th
Cir. 1953).
145. See BITT K R. FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 403-07 (2d ed.
1958).
146. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1) and (3).
147. See, by way of comparison, Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
discussed in text at notes 120-23 supra, in which the court analyzes results and finds that
contract rights give rise upon sale to capital gain or ordinary income depending upon
whether the interest of the vendor is enforceable in equity. 304 F2d at 130-34. See gen-
erally, RoBiNsoN, DEFiNrrION 96-98, 170-89 (1954) (discussing definition by analysis).
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income into a single amount, the telescoping policy would apply.148 Property
which produces a stream of income - both real investment property which
contributes directly to economic growth and financial investments which en-
able real investment to take place - is the object of the investment encourage-
ment policy.149 The policy of keeping investment funds liquid in order to
accelerate revenue production is particularly applicable to income which can
be realized either presently or over a period of years.'50 And long run ineffi-
ciency in the market allocation of resources has a harsher effect on the economy
than short term inefficiency.151
The utility of the stream of income test for the determination of proper
tax treatment can be seen by applying it to some of the transactions which
have generated litigation testing the capital gain-ordinary income distinc-
tion. Suppose the taxpayer has a favorable requirements contract for the
supply of coal for, say, a 30 year period. That contract is like a machine or
good will, providing the taxpayer with a continuing stream of income. Con-
sequently, under the Weaver guide its sale gives rise to proceeds taxable at
capital gain rates.152 In terms derived from Corn Products, the profits on
the sale of such a right constitute investment, not business, income. Of course,
if the requirements contract were to supply the enterprise for a term of days
or months, its character as an element in the capital structure would disappear.
The short-term requirements contract contributes to the stream of income
for too brief a duration to be considered an investment. It seems more like
the property in the exclusionary categories, such as inventory and accounts
receivable. 153 Similarly, the treatment of payments to a lessee' 54 or a les-
sor '" in consideration for cancellation of a lease would depend upon the pro-
ductive life of the property given up. The transfer of a fifteen year lease might
well be treated in a different manner from the sale of a two year leasehold
interest.
If "stream of income" is the test to determine inclusion in the capital struc-
ture and claims to capital gain treatment, courts will be confronted with the
problem of setting minimum limits before the source of an income stream
will be recognized as a capital asset. A means for meeting this uncertainty
is suggested by the Clifford solution to the income-splitting controversy. 5 6
The Supreme Court held in Helvering v. Clifford 15 that trust income was
148. See text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
149. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
151. See text following note 50 supra.
152. But see Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1958), and Commissioner
v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958).
153. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1), (3), (4), and (5).
154. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1952).
155. But see Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
156. The case for administrative activitism is well made in Eisenstein, Some Icono-
elastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. Rnv. 477 (1945).
157. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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taxable to whomever had substantial ownership of the trust property. But
the guides for judicially determining "substantial ownership" were so trouble-
some that one-hundred and fifty cases and a confusing body of case law was
generated in the five years following the Clifford decision.' 5 At that point,
the Treasury came to the rescue with the now famous Clifford Regulations,""
presently incorporated in the Internal Revenue Code.' 60 The Clifford Regu-
lations stated that if the settlor surrendered control of trust income and corpus
for at least ten years the income from the trust would be taxed to the trust
beneficiary and not to the settlor. In some sense the Treasury decision was
arbitrary, 61 but it was founded in experimentation and at least provided a
bright-line standard.162 Predictability, after all, should be a touchstone of tax
administration. The penumbral area of the capital gain-ordinary income
distinction seems to be an area which would also benefit from Clifford treat-
ment.
If property qualifying for capital asset classification is limited to capital
structure property, judges and administrators might well consider an attempt
to co-ordinate their notions of a qualified transaction to the requirements
imposed on "capital asset property." Both the telescoping 163 and investment
liquidity 1 64 policies presume an accelerated realization of anticipated earnings.
Courts and administrative departments therefore might reasonably require
not only that an asset representing a stream of income be converted, but also
that in order to qualify for capital gain treatment the stream of income be
converted into either a lump-sum payment or a series of payments to be
realized during a period substantially shorter than the stream was expected
to run.
165
158. Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L.
Rzv. 477, 492 (1945).
159. T.D. 5488, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 19.
160. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78.
161. See Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953), in which the court
maintains that the conclusive presumption of the Clifford Regulations is "arbitrary" to
the extent of being unconstitutional. The Internal Revenue Service announced that it
did not intend to follow the principle announced in Clark, Rev. Rul. 54-48, 1954-1 Cum.
BuL.. 24, and the Clifford statutory provisions have not been declared unconstitutional.
162. See Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly City of Legislative
Intention, 2 TAx L. REv. 327 (1946), and Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Adinins-
tration, 58 HARv. L. Rzv. 477 (1945).
163. See text at notes 34-45 supra.
164. See text at notes 47-50 supra.
165. This requirement could be imposed through defining the phrase sale or exchange
as it is used in the capital gain sections. An obvious precedent is the process of defining
property initiated in Corn Products, discussed at notes 125-38 supra.
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